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The bonfires of quangos has thus far only smouldered
Quangos have become an established feature of government while also being subject to
widespread condemnation by the political class. Katherine Tonkiss and Katharine
Dommett review their present status and the prospects for reform, arguing that there is a
broader challenge in terms of how public bodies reform is reconciled with wider civil service
reforms.
Quangos, non-departmental public bodies, or arm’s length bodies (ALBs), as they are
variably termed, are a category of  public organisations that operate with a degree of
independence f rom ministers. These bodies have become an established f eature of
government, created to deliver policy, of f er expertise and regulation (among other
f unctions). Yet despite their prolif eration they have been widely condemned by the polit ical
class and are subject to f requent reviews and culls. In reality f ew attempts to address the
number and signif icance of  bodies have, thus f ar, yielded much success. Indeed, hitherto
the bonf ires of  quangos have smouldered rather than raged.
In this light David Cameron’s call in 2009 f or the existence of  ‘each and every quango’ to be justif ied in
accordance with three tests appeared litt le more than a restatement of  established polit ical rhetoric.
However, building on the Conservative manif esto commitment, the Coalit ion Government moved quickly
to ‘reduce the number and cost of  quangos’, conducting a review in the summer of  2010. Af ter just f ive
months in government 902 quangos had been surveyed and 200 bodies scheduled f or abolit ion, 120 f or
merger and 176 f or substantial ref orm. This early pace signalled a clear determination on the part of  the
Government to shrink the size of  the state, inf ormed by their desire to reduce ‘the cost of  bureaucracy
and the number of  public bodies’, ‘to increase accountability’ and to achieve ‘ef f iciency, ef f ectiveness
and economy in the exercise of  public f unctions’.
Two years on, the recently published Public Bodies 2012 report provides an overview of  this ref ormed
quango landscape. But what level of  success has been attained? Each of  the Government’s objectives is
assessed in turn below, evaluating progress thus f ar and identif ying f uture challenges to the ref orm
agenda.
Are There Fewer Quangos?
The implementation of  the ref orm programme was rapid, despite occurring in a period of  relative
instability (given budget and staf f ing reductions, as well as widespread civil service ref orm). Public Bodies
2012 states that since 2010 the number of  NDPBs has been reduced by 220. While this denotes
substantial progress on this objective, most bodies abolished thus f ar have been smaller advisory
bodies and many f unctions have survived, being transf erred into departments, executive agencies or
merged into the remit of  other bodies. Accordingly, while the numbers of  arm’s length bodies is reducing,
the scope of  government is not necessarily shrinking.
In addition, a number of  new bodies have been created by the coalit ion. Public Bodies 2012 notes that
nine new bodies have been created since 2010 – six independent monitoring boards, the National
Employment Savings Trust, the Of f ice f or Budgetary Responsibility and the Independent Commission f or
Aid Impact. However, the scope of  Public Bodies 2012 is limited to NDPBs only, and this prevents a wider
appreciation of  changes in arm’s length bodies more generally. For example, some new executive
agencies – such as the f our created in the Department f or Education, the Legal Aid Agency, the proposed
National Crime Agency – and also other organisational f orms such as the Of f ice of  Tax Simplif ication (an
‘independent of f ice of  the Treasury’) are NDPBs in a new f orm. The overt f ocus on numbers of  NDPBs
theref ore misses the wider question of  where f unctions of  government are located – and many are
remaining at arm’s length.
Have They Saved Money?
The belief  that inef f iciency and poor governance was rif e within public bodies provided a key motivation
to not only abolish but also ref orm ALB governance. In embarking on the ref orm programme, the Cabinet
Of f ice publicised anticipated savings of  £2.6 billion by 2015 and ongoing savings of  between £800 and
£900 million a year af ter the Spending Review. A third of  the init ial saving (£0.9billion) was predicted to
come f rom the abolit ion of  two bodies, the Regional Development Agencies and Becta, yet the rest was
based on imprecise and of ten incomparable data f rom departments. For example, some estimated
reductions were based on spending review requirements, whilst others f ocused exclusively on savings
f rom ALB ref orm.
This lack of  consistency led an NAO report to argue that the Cabinet Of f ice did ‘not yet have the means
to conf irm the removal of  £2.6 billion f rom administrative budgets’ or to check that this money was the
result of  savings rather than cuts. In its response, the Government highlighted that this f igure
incorporates wider ef f iciency savings f rom bodies that will continue to exist, but acknowledged that the
cost of  ref orm was still unclear. Indeed, the projected savings stemming f rom ref orm have recently been
reviewed, and Public Bodies 2012 puts administrative savings at £401 million in the year 2011/12.
Furthermore, in calculating the money saved, lit t le attention has been directed to the costs of  transit ion,
f ailing to consider the dif f icult ies of , f or example, disposing of  assets and addressing redundancy costs.
While the NAO has estimated transit ion to potentially cost £830 million, Public Bodies 2012 estimates the
cost of  ref orm to be between £650 million and £800 million. This wide variation in estimates again
highlights the challenges f aced by the Cabinet Of f ice in demonstrating that ef f iciencies are a direct result
of  the public bodies ref orm agenda.
Are They More Accountable?
Government has sought to increase the accountability of  ALBs by bringing them closer to departments
and Ministers. In addition to the newly created executive agencies, the f unctions of  9 bodies have been
transf erred to executive agencies (which are said to enjoy f ar less autonomy f rom Government
compared to other f orms of  ALB); and 16 have been transf erred into departments. For the bodies that
remain, a process of  triennial review is being implemented whereby each body is subject to independent
review every three years – serving to provide departments and Ministers with more awareness of  their
ALBs and thus improve the accountability (and ef f iciency) of  these bodies.
However, the idea that moving bodies closer to the centre will increase accountability is not as clear cut
as it seems. There is a risk that f unctions in, f or example, executive agencies, will not be scrutinised to
the same extent as those in NDPBs where triennial reviews occur. In reducing the length of  the arm at
which key f unctions are exercised, there is theref ore a risk that f ormal structures of  accountability,
enhanced as a part of  the ref orm programme, are bypassed.
Conclusion
The public bodies ref orm programme has represented a radical attempt to streamline arm’s length
governance in the UK. The speed at which ref orm has been implemented and the numerous bodies
abolished or otherwise ref ormed denotes considerable success over these f irst two years of  ref orm.
However, it remains unclear as to whether the ref orm programme will deliver on the government’s
objectives to improve the ef f iciency and accountability of  the arm’s length governance landscape.
The Government has committed to implementing a ‘benefits realisation framework’ which will enable
departments to ‘better define, measure and optimise all forms of value created in consistent and credible
way’, with a greater emphasis on improving the efficiency and accountability of the bodies that survived
the cull. With these new developments, there is a possibility that the initial momentum of reform will be
maintained, allowing the government to deliver greater efficiency and accountability across the public
bodies landscape.
There remains, however, a broader challenge in terms of  how public bodies ref orm is reconciled with
wider civil service ref orms. Public bodies ref orm was, in part, a centripetal process involving the transf er
of  f unctions back into departments. In contrast, the Civil Service Ref orm Plan clearly has a centrif ugal
logic that is based around pushing f unctions away f rom Whitehall and tradit ional bureaucratic structures,
through emerging models of  service delivery such as outsourcing and mutualisation. The next phase of
public bodies ref orm will need to reconcile these contrasting logics in a way that delivers ef f iciency while
still serving the accountability goal of  public bodies ref orm.
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